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American Banker and Federal Financial Analytics are holding a joint forum with Sens. Vitter and Brown to discuss their bill to rein in the big banks and whether some institutions are "too big to fail."
April 17 -
Demands for action to fix "too big to fail" are near a fever pitch. Following are the most likely scerios for how the debate is resolved.
March 22 -
Policymakers clearly don't want to harm small banks, but it's difficult to see how they can insulate us from the macroeconomic effects of some of the proposals being considered.
April 15 -
There is no simple solution to "too big to fail," a complicated problem born of a series of policy missteps that will take years to unwind. The sooner everyone accepts that reality, the sooner we can tackle the necessary items to make sound public policy.
April 3 -
If regulators have the will and the authority to resolve "too big to fail," now is the time to act. The prospect of several more years without resolution is terrifying.
April 5
Go ahead. Break up the big banks. Cut JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (NYSE:C) and Wells Fargo (WFC) down to a size where they're no longer too big to fail, jail, manage, regulate or challenge politically.
No question, it'd make a lot of big-bank bashers feel good. It'd probably eliminate some consumer abuses as well by getting rid of the "
What breaking up the big banks will not do is make our financial system much safer.
The reason is simple. The real threat to the financial system is not a handful of banks so big that their failures would bring it down. The primary threat is that the system is so interconnected and complex that the failure of a bank big or small, or an institution that exists in the industry's shadow, can imperil everyone else with little or no warning.
History holds plenty of evidence. The Great Depression involved the demise of
Savings and loans stumbled into a
Long-Term Capital Management got into another sort of mess in 1998.The relatively small, virtually unknown hedge fund run by a Nobel laureate had made complex and ultimately dead-wrong bets in esoteric derivatives. Federal Reserve officials and the people running giant investment banks soon concluded that they faced the prospect of either bailing out LTCM or watching the entire interconnected financial system get pulled under. This time it was Wall Street that footed the bill (except for Jimmy Cayne's Bear Stearns, which refused to pitch in).
Lastly, consider one of the biggest blowups of the most recent financial crisis. Until it struck, AIG was considered an ultra-safe insurer and not the sort of institution that threatened world finance. Eventually AIG, like LTCM before it, was recognized as having placed bets on derivatives that went against it on such a scale that it threatened to take down the insurer and an untold number of counterparties that were counting on it to hedge their own bets. Once again, the dominoes proved so close together that the downfall of one would topple them all.
When the housing boom went south, it didn't really matter whether the banks that had done the lending were Goliaths or peewees. What mattered is that they'd all made the same false assumptions and bad investments. It's what Ludwig Chincarini calls "crowded trades" in his book
The too big to fail debate is important. The risk in focusing too intently on it is that we'll once again end up fighting the last war while setting ourselves up to suffer big losses in the next one. For all we know, the real threat we now face is not another big-bank blowup but the unprecedented amounts of liquidity being pumped into the financial system by the very people who are supposed to keep it safe and sound.
Neil Weinberg is the editor in chief of American Banker. The views expressed are his own.