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The return to profitability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is not a reason to preserve them as part of a future housing finance system.
May 17 -
Loan performance data show the entire case against GSE underwriting standards, and their role in the financial crisis, is based on social stereotyping, smoke and mirrors, and little else.
May 17 -
The introduction of more private, risk-bearing capital to housing finance should expand homeownership possibilities.
April 22 -
The sensitivity now present at the highest levels of the Fed, OCC and FDIC offers great promise to consumers looking to acquire responsible loans from the banking industry.
April 11
It's been five years since the mortgage meltdown. Mistakes were made and expectations were lowered. It's now time we look back in retrospect, analyze what worked and refine it based on what we've learned during the past five years. The secondary mortgage market is still struggling to rebound and the question of how to handle the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, persists.
The answer, however, may be simple. It's time to head back to the future.
Despite the grandstanding from some politicians, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not going away entirely. More important, they shouldn't go away. For almost 50 years prior to the meltdown in 2007, Fannie and Freddie were private entities traded on Wall Street. Both facilitated capital into the mortgage lending market and they were excellent at it. However, things got a little sideways when both GSEs started participating in riskier lending that was outside their original charter.
We all know the story of how Fannie and Freddie ended up where they are today: private entities, meltdown, conservatorship, government bailout. They unfortunately experienced bad loans and now they've taken their losses. It really isn't any different than a regular business going through bankruptcy procedures.
Now, both GSEs are experiencing record profits
Of course, Fannie and Freddie reform will face opposition. The reforms that are crucial for ongoing recovery and stabilization would require Congress to diminish their involvement in the lending business and allow the GSEs to do what they do best: act as a conduit for private capital to enter the residential lending market.
So, what does the secondary market need then?
The secondary market needs the GSEs to play the role it used to play so well: producing conventional, high quality loans, while issuing high quality securities from those loans. How will past successes of the GSEs and lessons learned from the current government conservatorship marry to modify the roles they play now?
According to the Department of Commerces census statistics,
Private investors have their own particular underwriting guidelines, as do Fannie and Freddie. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's lengthy qualified mortgage rule also provides the blueprint for the standards the GSEs will require in the future. Under current Fannie stipulations, a borrower must be employed by the same employer for at least two years. In our fluctuating market, borrowers with new jobs will find themselves out of luck if they wish to close on a Fannie loan, even if they have impeccable credit history.
By allowing Fannie and Freddie to share risk with private investors, credit enhancements such as mortgage insurance would extend credit to borrowers who are creditworthy but currently cannot attain it due to strict underwriting guidelines. This would all happen while minimizing the risk to taxpayers. It would also increase competition, drive down lending expenses, place more borrowers in the market and fuel the housing recovery.
The mortgage reform process will be no easy feat. The secondary market reform begins with bringing private capital back into the mortgage market and minimizing the taxpayer burden for the GSEs. Underwriting standards can then be modified to extend credit to more borrowers. Policymakers need to assure standards are tight enough to ensure the borrower's ability to repay, yet flexible enough for borrowers with various financial states to qualify. The current conservative underwriting guidelines bar large segments of the borrower market, hindering people from obtaining credit and purchasing a house.
Fannie and Freddie
Scott K. Stucky is chief operating officer of DocuTech Corp., a provider of mortgage loan documents, compliance services and technology solutions for the mortgage industry.