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The federal government is now even more involved in the design, pricing, allocation and servicing of home mortgage credit than during the subprime lending debacle. Current proposals that call for government involvement would further entrench this situation.
May 6 -
The introduction of more private, risk-bearing capital to housing finance should expand homeownership possibilities.
April 22
Recent news stories conclude
Regarding the first point, the key feature of generally accepted accounting principles is dual-entry bookkeeping. Fannie Mae recently reported a markup of over $50 billion for a "
Regarding the larger point, current reported profitability of a government monopoly has nothing to do with the public interest. The only constitutionally authorized monopoly charter was for the U.S Post Office, "profitable" until competition from FedEx and UPS reduced their margins.
The next big U.S. government monopoly was the U.S. Federal Reserve System, chartered in 1913, but not granted the exclusive franchise to print global currency until the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944. In recent years, the Federal Reserve has acted as a large GSE, buying both Treasury securities and agency mortgage securities. Earnings on what Treasury pays (or guarantees) exceeding about $90 billion annually have been appropriately returned to the Treasury as dividends. Whether or not these monetary policies are appropriate is open to debate, but the short-term reported Treasury profits and deficit reduction most likely followed by capital losses when the portfolio is liquidated is not a legitimate policy consideration.
Fannie and Freddie monopoly charters were granted in the 1970s. They are currently profitable not because they are more efficient than the private sector although some analysts try to make this historically unprecedented argument but because their monopoly advantage has increased under conservatorship as the "agency status" guarantee is now a certainty, government accounting notwithstanding. Adjusting for cost of funds and balance sheet differences between them and the Federal Reserve, they should be generating about
The U.S. and U.K. were allies militarily during World War II, but adversaries in the design of the post-war economic system, as discussed most recently in "
Prior to their failure, Fannie and Freddie generally denied virtually any public cost (as do most government agencies now conducting government economic cost-benefit analyses). If there was any intellectual merit to this argument, then it could equally be applied to all services. That's already been tried elsewhere, with spectacularly unsuccessful results. If they were equally efficient as competitive firms, economic costs would equal benefits. (But when are government monopolies ever as efficient as competitive private firms?)
It is ironic that U.S. politicians, who historically favored free trade and competitive private markets and who now promote tax reform and the end of "too big to fail" purportedly to get rid of political preferences and protectionism simultaneously make the case for granting imperial preferences to these two monopoly government-sponsored enterprises.
Kevin Villani, chief economist at Freddie Mac from 1982 to 1985, is a principal of University Financial Associates and an executive scholar at the Burnham-Moores Center for Real Estate of the University of San Diego.