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Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, is pressing the Securities and Exchange Commission to revoke certain privileges from banks when they are involved in settlements or enforcement actions for illegal activity.
June 13 -
The Securities and Exchange Commission just gave unregistered banks a way to quickly raise capital at a fortuitous time and marketplace lending platforms a way to reclaim their peer-to-peer roots.
March 26 -
A top enforcer for the SEC says the agency is worried that banks are concealing asset risk while also discussing his strategy for uncovering wrongdoing by banks and other firms.
October 22 -
Pushback by the Securities and Exchange Commission is complicating a regulatory effort to investigate whether large asset managers should be labeled "systemically risky."
June 13
For those suspicious of the big banks, theres a new bugbear in town: the Securities and Exchange Commission's practice of
But there is little evidence to support these claims. On the contrary, the evidence suggests we should welcome these waivers, encourage firms and individuals to request them, and perhaps even narrow the circumstances under which they might be required in the first place.
In general, a company that wants to sell securities must register with the SEC and must comply with a notoriously complex set of disclosure requirements. This registration process alone can cost millions of dollars and require many hours of work from the company, its lawyers and underwriters, and the SEC staff.
Because these requirements are so onerous, federal securities laws include a number of exemptions that permit issuers to use a more streamlined process to offer their securities to investors. These exemptions exist for offerings that are believed to present a lower risk of fraud for example, because the company has a large public float and is well-known to the market, because the securities are not being offered to the public, or because the offering will be fairly small.
The SEC's bad actor provisions automatically disqualify firms and individuals that break certain securities laws from using these streamlined processes. The idea is that firms that have violated these laws have shown themselves to be dishonest and therefore cannot be trusted to use the exemptions appropriately. The SEC, however, has the authority to waive the disqualification for defendants who can show good cause as to why the disqualification shouldn't apply to them. The decision to grant a waiver is currently made by SEC staff involved in the enforcement action that resulted in the disqualification. Often, the waiver is granted as part of a settlement agreement.
Recently proposed
This proposal, if enacted, would generate enormous expense for both the SEC and for market participants. There is no reason to believe that defendants would stop requesting waivers. Each request would therefore entail not only the hearing itself, but extensive preparation by the defendant and the SEC. The SEC staff would also have to review and respond to written public comment.
Then, assuming the process results in more disqualifications as is surely the bills intent SEC staff and the market would be denied the efficiencies created by the exemptions from full registration. A company that has been disqualified will generally either have to raise capital under a more burdensome process, or it might decide that the process is now too expensive and will decide not to raise capital at all.
If the company decides not to raise capital, it will also give up the activities that would have been funded by that capital such as hiring additional workers. And if the company does decide to use full registration, it will mean more work for the SEC. Any increase in disclosures increases the paperwork that SEC staff must review, and any increase in regulatory process increases staff time spent ensuring compliance.
The expense might be justified, of course, if the proposal clearly provided significant benefits such as acting as a fraud deterrent or preventing well-connected firms from receiving unearned privileges. But there is no evidence that the legislation would benefit anyone at all, except perhaps the lawyers and compliance professionals responsible for completing the extra paperwork.
A recent
Nor does the study provide evidence that the SEC grants waivers reflexively. Indeed, in a recent
Moreover, there is no proof that firms that receive waivers are encouraged to commit further misdeeds. While the study by Velikonja found that some companies receive waivers several years in a row, recidivism is immaterial unless the violations suggest a propensity toward the type of fraud the disqualification was intended to prevent.
In fact, what little we know of the waiver process suggests that we should encourage parties to seek them out. In the same
There may be some merit in asking the SEC to provide better public information about the waiver process, given the dearth of available data. But Congress should take care to ensure that any new record-keeping requirements serve to inform the public and not to discourage defendants from requesting waivers.
If Congress is genuinely concerned about how the SEC currently grants waivers, it might first commission a study from the Government Accountability Office to compile the type of data now lacking. But when the SEC chair herself has told us that the rules are designed to disqualify firms and individuals that pose no real risk to the system, the last thing we need are fewer waivers.
Thaya Brook Knight is associate director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute. Follow her on Twitter