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Big banks have successfully reversed a Dodd-Frank provision that would have required them to move swaps from their FDIC-insured depository institutions into uninsured subsidiaries. But in so doing, they have inadvertently thrust the issue of implicit subsidies back into the spotlight.
December 18 -
On its face, the House vote late Thursday to approve a spending bill that included an unrelated provision written by Citigroup was a big legislative victory for the bank and its fellow Wall Street behemoths. Yet its also a victory that comes at a high price.
December 11 -
The repeal of the swaps push-out provision will reduce banks' operational costs, but it makes little difference in terms of increasing the size of the government safety net. The reason: with or without the rule, the government protects the swaps contracts of the largest institutions.
December 18
"We are the 99%," goes the familiar slogan of the Occupy Wall Street movement. Community bankers may be surprised to find that they, too, are the 99% in a game that is rigged in favor of large banks. This fact is exemplified by the recent congressional showdown over the gutting of Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the swaps push-out rule.
Passed with bipartisan support in 2010, the rule forced large banks to move their risky swap activities from insured depository institutions to nonbank affiliates. The change was aimed at ensuring that banks would not enjoy government support (i.e., access to federal deposit insurance and the discount window) for these activities. But despite vociferous opposition from progressives like Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a near-repeal of Section 716 was recently passed as part of the congressional budget bill.
Community bankers who focus on traditional, productive banking would have been unaffected by Section 716. This was not by coincidence, but rather by design. Congress took greats pains to craft the rule in a way that would leave
In short, the swaps push-out rule had nothing to do with community banksthe 99%. It should be of no surprise, then, that banking behemoth Citigroup was behind the swaps push-out amendment, having
Big banks had been trying to overturn the rule for a while. The House of Representatives actually passed Citigroup's amendment back in October 2013. The Senate prudently refused to pass it. Undeterred, supporters of the provision managed in December 2014 to sneak it into must-pass legislation. The House once again passed the swaps amendment, and the Senate this time was compelled to follow suit in order to avoid a government shutdown. The amendment would have had no chance of passage in the current Senate as a standalone bill. But the big banks were determined to have their way, by hook or by crook.
The swaps push-out amendment is typical of big banks' deregulatory playbook. Large institutions wish to remain free to speculate in the opaque financial instruments that Warren Buffett has rightly called "financial weapons of mass destruction." To achieve this end, they have sought to undo regulations intended to place limits on complex financial products, arguing that deregulation would improve the economy and
In so arguing, big banks gloss over the fact that in 2008 their financial WMDs ruined the global economy and actually increased the cost of capital for community bankers. Unfortunately, many community banks are complicit in their attempts, exhibiting a financial version of Stockholm syndrome. They have lobbied against regulations even when those regulations mainly affect big banks and leave smaller banks unscathed.
The lobbying barrage against the swaps push-out rule is an example of this pattern. Many
The truth is that the amendment to Section 716 serves as little more than a public subsidy to a handful of big banks. As argued by
Moreover, the amendment serves as a windfall for big banks by allowing them to avoid swaps clearinghouses. The original Section 716
This hedging requirement is cold comfort. Let us recall that JPMorgan Chase attempted to characterize the $6 billion loss it suffered from its uncleared London Whale bets as emanating from "
Because of the amendment, if a dealer like JPMorgan were to default because of swaps gone bad, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. would likely be left holding the bag as the first line of defense rather than a consortium of dealers in a clearinghouse,. Admittedly, FDIC also
Thus, in passing the amendment, Congress has opted for government guarantees instead of private risk mitigation. This is the exact opposite of a free-market solution. The vast majority of structured finance swaps are not cleared, so the nation is now primed for a repeat of the government bailouts seen in 2008.
The amendment also grants swap dealers a third, under-reported subsidy: access to virtually interest-free loans under the Fed's discount window. Hospitals, charities, underwater homeowners, military veterans, aid workers, widows, orphans none of these worthy parties are normally eligible for interest-free loans from the government. The privilege is afforded only to depository institutions. This reflects a fundamental pact that the country has made with the banking sector: banks should spread capital to the broader economy in exchange for the ability to make money from interest.
Community banks abide by this agreement every day. But the same can hardly be said for bigwig banks that leverage
Akshat Tewary is an attorney practicing in New Jersey, a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitrator and President of Occupy the SEC, a nonprofit advocating for financial reform. His Twitter handle is